

## Scenario 24

### **Pakistan: Facts On Kargil Issue:**

The disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir has been a continuous cause of tension and wars between Pakistan and India. A plebiscite was promised with the Kashmiri populace to be held under UN Security Council Resolutions of 13<sup>th</sup> August 1948 and 5<sup>th</sup> January 1949 but the moment never came to make it true. An unending freedom struggle since then is going on in that part of Kashmir which is occupied by India.

The plans and physical movement gained sudden momentum in 1999 when the freedom fighters made high-altitude conquests in that troubled territory. They captured high ground of a 140 kilometres long stretch of 4,500 meters high mountain ridges, near the strategic Indian-held garrison towns of Kargil and Drass. These towns lie on the only usable road between Srinagar, capital of Indian-occupied Kashmir, and the East. The cropped up situation threatened India's main supply route to its forces deployed on the Indo - Chinese border.

There had existed a sort of 'gentleman's agreement' between India and Pakistan that the armies of either side will not occupy posts from the 15<sup>th</sup> September to 15<sup>th</sup> April of each year. This had been the case since 1972, but in 1999 when the Indian forces returned to the mountains, they were surprised to find around 600 Kashmiri freedom fighters, occupying their lands five kilometres inside Indian occupied Kashmir. India alleged that these Kashmiri fighters and militants were sponsored by the Pakistan Army who had crossed the Line of Control (LoC) in an attempt to alter the de facto border by force.

***South Asia Tribune dated 30<sup>th</sup> August 2004:*** a former ISI Chief Lt Gen (Retd) Javed Nasir held Gen Musharraf responsible for major slips in the disastrous Kargil misadventure and demanded that an inquiry commission of senior retired army officers should have been formed to determine what mistakes were made. In a press article he mentioned that:

*'Major slips in the application of methodology and the evolution, implementation and execution of the operational instructions were made. Regretfully, unlike the Indian side, instead of sacking, some of those responsible were promoted. Though Gen Musharraf had given some detailed briefings to Nawaz Sharif but in which month Kargil was occupied and when was the first briefing given was perhaps deliberately omitted; this most serious issue was not cleared by anyone; neither by army nor by PM's team.'*

Some facts taken from an article published in daily ***The Nation*** dated ***30<sup>th</sup> August 2004*** places a fair scenario of our contemporary history before us: that Kargil was a part of the Azad Kashmir and under the control of Pakistani troops up to 1972. Because of 'permafrost' high altitude features mostly exceeding 17,000 feet, logistic dumping in the area was always considered difficult and pain taking.

After humiliating surrender of Pakistan Army on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1971, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi surfaced as a victorious leader and knew that whatever she would dictate at Simla would have to be accepted by Bhutto. Therefore, she included a term about Kashmir in the Simla agreement that:

*'The areas captured across ceasefire line (CFL) in Kashmir would neither be vacated nor given back, instead the present line held will be termed as LoC but areas*

*captured across the recognized international borders would be given back by both sides on the western front.'*

The Indian Army Chief, therefore, moved his troops to occupy the vacant snow line features in Kargil. Pakistan's Army Chief Gen Tikka Khan, not knowing details of Simla Agreement, believed that upon ceasefire all the areas under adverse occupation across the Cease Fire Line (CFL) would be vacated by the two countries and given back to the respective governments as was done in 1965.

After the occupation of Kargil, the Indian army opened the road along Shyok River to the mouth of Siachen and Ladakh which previously was dominated and overlooked by the Kargil heights and always remained under occupation of Pakistani scouts. Beyond that point the CFL towards Siachen were left unmarked in 1973 because of inaccessibility.

The Indians neither ever claimed Siachen nor challenged Pakistan's control over it. After gaining Kargil in 1972, the Indians started experimenting adventures there in early 1980s and finally occupied the Siachen heights in April 1984 before the Pakistani troops were to move in.

Gen Mirza Aslam Beg planned to play back Siachen on the Indians in Kargil and he could do so because he had the best team at GHQ Pakistan would ever have. Gen Shamim Alam as the CGS & Gen Jahangir Karamat as the DGMO were in his team to go ahead with strategic military plans. The plans were presented to the President G Ishaq Khan and PM Benazir in 1989. The response was an utter disapproval from the both based on two factors.

- That India was an established nuclear power then.
- That the freedom struggle by *Kashmiris* was at a very preliminary stage then as had been estimated by the media.

Such an armed activism could have invited undue retaliation for which Pakistan had no resources to meet with. Gen Beg got disappointed.

Pakistan's nuclear explosions in May 1998 had proved that its nuclear technology was far superior to the Indian technology and that made Indian & Western media believe that balance of power in South Asia was visible. When Gen Musharraf was appointed as the Army Chief in October 1998, within the first hour of his take over he issued transfer orders of six Lieutenant Generals of his choice which included both the CGS and Chaklala Corps Commander. The Chief had himself, while serving as DGMO, minutely gone through the 1989 script of the Kargil Plan which was turned down by Benazir Bhutto.

After minute analysis of the Kargil Plan, Gen Musharraf gave the green signal. The responsibility beyond this point was that of his team comprising the CGS, Corps Commander, DGMO and Commander FCNA but, perhaps, correct method was not followed to get the government's approval. Operation was allowed by the Army Chief, it started but the credit was attributed to *Mujahideen* for the occupation of key positions.

The fact remained that Pakistan Army was to come in by all means to thwart Indian attempts to recapture these positions, thus prior approval of the PM was a must for total support as this operation would instantly become a global issue and might lead to a war between India & Pakistan.

Gen Javed Nasir, though a former DG ISI, had learnt about Kargil's move at the end of March 1999 in Karachi. He met PM Nawaz Sharif in the first week of April 1999 and asked about Kargil Operation who had no idea till then. In May 1999, Gen Javed Nasir had met the Pakistan's Air Chief who told that:

*'He and the Naval Chief had learnt about the Kargil Operation for the first time in April 1999 when Gen Musharraf told the PM about that development just as a passing reference.'*

It was never done earlier, of course, a thorough discussion was needed which should have been through before the start of the Operation.

The Government of Pakistan tried to convince the world media that it was only the moral, diplomatic and political support that Pakistan used to extend to Kashmiri freedom fighters for their cause of self-determination. It further clarified that the heights near Kargil were occupied by indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters and not the Pakistan's army, but it was not the whole truth.

With India's nuclear re-tests in 1998, and in the intervening period of Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1999, Indian leaders like L K Advani threatened to occupy Azad Kashmir by force. Accompanying the declaratory threats, there was actual movements of the Indian Army seen across the LOC, with massive targeting of villages of the AJK side. However, the threatening statements also revealed the ongoing Indian military planning to alter the LOC in such a way that the rest fell into its lap.

The PML(N)'s associate columnists always narrate in media that the Kargil episode had taken away the fruit of Indian PM Vajpayee's Lahore tour of 21-22<sup>nd</sup> February 1999 and of Lahore Declaration. An article titled 'Kargil War: the Real Facts' available on [www.defencetalk.com](http://www.defencetalk.com) puts forward another story that:

*'The fact of the matter is that Prime Minister Vajpayee himself began undermining the process when he reneged on the agreements he had signed in Lahore, especially in relation to Kashmir, as soon as he was back in New Delhi. In fact, even before he left Lahore, he remarked, in connection with his commitment to discuss Kashmir in bilateral Pakistan-India talks:*

*"Only history can be discussed, not the geography of Kashmir."*

*Other members of his cabinet then began making statements that what had been discussed in Lahore had been Indian claims over Azad Kashmir. With this approach, bilateral talks were a non-starter despite Lahore, by the time the BJP government fell in April 1999.'*

In order to put the onus on Pakistan, from October 1998 to February 1999, India accused Pakistan of launching as many as 17 attacks on their posts in the Siachen area. They claimed that they had beaten back all these attacks. Those allegations were to divert Pakistan's attention and draw its forces into the Siachen sector while Indian forces tried to take over unoccupied areas along the LOC.

Another important development at the time was the reported presence of Russian technical experts who were assisting Indian troops in their trials of a high altitude bunker-busting missile system in the Kargil area.

Kargil War took place between 8<sup>th</sup> May, when Pakistani forces and Kashmiri militants were detected atop the Kargil ridges and 14<sup>th</sup> July 1999, the day cease fire implemented. During the war 524 Indian soldiers were dead and 1,363 wounded; on Pakistan side 696 soldiers and 40 civilians were killed as per statistics released by Defense Minister George Fernandez of India on 1<sup>st</sup> December 1999. Contrarily the Pakistani media had told us of 2700 Pakistani army men and proportionate numbers of officers of all ranks declared dead.

**On 26<sup>th</sup> May 1999**, India resorted to air strikes to drive out the freedom fighters. During this episode, two Indian aircraft entered the territory of Pakistan, one of which was shot down. The situation across LoC became tense and several innocent civilians became the targets of indiscriminate Indian shelling. The international community got concerns about the escalation of conflict between the two new nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. Talks, however, held between the two states in summer 1999 and efforts were made to resolve the crisis.

An intervention by Bill Clinton, the US President persuaded Pakistan to use its influence on the freedom fighters to avert a full-scale war with India. They, however, vacated the captured territory by August 1999.

Interestingly, Pakistan had initially blamed the incursion on independent Kashmiri insurgents but then retreated. Attacks by the Indian army and air force eventually forced Pakistani troops to come back. Pakistan had sustained enormous losses including deaths of hundreds of army men and proportionate number of officers of all ranks as given above.

The other side of this conflict was more damaging. Differences broke out between the elected government of Nawaz Sharif and the Army Chief Gen Musharraf. Very serious questions were raised that did COAS Gen Musharraf, then serving under the PM Nawaz Sharif, inform him about his plans to send the Army to occupy the Kargil heights? If so, was the COAS formally permitted to go ahead? Was the attack plan formally placed before the then Corp Commander's meeting afresh [*or the same ten years old planning worked out by Gen Mirza Aslam Beg in 1989 was as such implemented questioning that whether the PM was taken into confidence*].

These questions assumed importance in the light of two interviews given by Lt Gen (Rtd) Jamshed Gulzar Kiani on **2<sup>nd</sup> June 2008**, to the **Geo TV** and the **Dawn Daily** of Karachi. J G Kiani was a Major-General in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at the time of Kargil conflict and the subsequent coup against Nawaz Sharif. The ISI was then headed by Lt Gen Ziauddin, a Kashmiri origin officer from the Engineer Corps but considered to be a buddy of PM Nawaz Sharif.

The differences between Gen Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif initially developed shortly after the appointment of Gen Musharraf by Nawaz Sharif as the COAS in October 1998. The main issue cropped up was Nawaz Sharif's ruling over Gen Musharraf's objections to the appointment of an engineer Gen Ziauddin as the Director-General of the ISI. Gen Ziauddin was a close confidante of Nawaz Sharif and used to keep him informed of all actions of Gen Musharraf.

Gen Musharraf had stopped inviting Ziauddin to the meetings of the Corps Commanders. During the same period Maj Gen Jamshed G Kiani was taken into confidence by Gen Musharraf to keep an eye on the activities of his DG (ISI) Gen Ziauddin. Most of the key operations of intelligence, which were the normal domain of the ISI, were taken out from ISI's jurisdiction and were allocated to the Military Intelligence (MI) Directorate indirectly being controlled by Gen Musharraf himself.

In the above mentioned TV program, Lt Gen (Rtd) J G Kiani had levelled various allegations against Gen Musharraf regarding the Kargil episode, Gen Musharraf's post 9 / 11 co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism and the commando raid into the *Lal Masjid* of Islamabad in July 2007. He stated that:

*'.....according to his [Gen Jamshed Gulzar Layani] information, Nawaz Sharif did not know any thing about the Kargil episode. He was never thoroughly briefed on the issue. I personally support the holding of a judicial probe into the Kargil fiasco.'*

In his interview to daily the **Dawn** on the same day of **2<sup>nd</sup> June 2008**, Gen J G Kiani said that Nawaz Sharif, the majority of corps commanders and the ISI were kept in the dark about the Kargil operation in 1999. Although Nawaz Sharif was briefed on the Kargil issue but it was fairly late and the conflict had taken start by then. *'It was not a comprehensive briefing that the Chief Executive should have been given.'*

In nut shell, Gen J G Kiani had spoken well against Gen Musharraf but in October 1999, he was one of those hand-picked conspirators who, in association with Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), had staged a coup against Nawaz Sharif (that too in the absence of Gen Musharraf because he was in the air then on his way back from Colombo), arrested the PM because he had dismissed Gen Musharraf and appointed Lt Gen Ziauddin as the COAS. They prevented Lt Gen Ziauddin from entering the office of the COAS and arrested him subsequently against all the norms and traditions of Pakistan Army.

For so many months a debate continued in senior circles of the Pakistani intelligentsia that whether PM Nawaz Sharif's behaviour to appoint an Army Chief from Engineering Corp, ignoring all the seniority lists and traditions, was a professional decision. Of course it was not. That is why he had suffered bitterly.

Gen Musharraf rewarded Gen J G Kiani for his unforgettable services immediately and promoted him as Lt Gen and appointed him as Corps Commander within one month of October 1999 coup. The two were very close to each other. Gen Musharraf used to appreciate his cooperation before the days of 'take-over' by keeping him informed of the activities of Lt Gen Ziauddin and his links with Nawaz Sharif beyond the normal scope of ISI's charter of duties.

Not only was that, Lt Gen J G Kiani was given the most important job of controlling Rawalpindi Corps for his services. When he reached the age of superannuation in 2003, Gen Musharraf third time rewarded his loyalty by appointing him as the Chairman of the Federal Public Services Commission, which post had a fixed tenure of five years under the law.

Serious differences developed between the two when Lt Gen J G Kiani as the Chairman of the Commission did not oblige Gen Musharraf and Mr Shaukat Aziz, the former Prime Minister, in respect of some appointments of officers. Gen Musharraf asked him to resign. He declined. Gen Musharraf managed a bill passed by the National Assembly in September 2006 reducing the tenure of Chairman FPSC from five to three years. Lt Gen Jamshed Gulzar Kiani was then sent home at the end of three years.

Talking to the media on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2008, Nawaz Sharif demanded the trial of Gen Musharraf on treason charges for his illegal act of 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2007, imposing a State of Emergency, the *Lal Masjid* carnage and keeping the nation, military officials and the then political leadership in dark on the Kargil issue. Nawaz Sharif alleged that:

*'Gen Musharraf's description of the Kargil issue in his book, **In the Line of Fire**, is a pack of lies and that the interview of Gen Jamshed Gulzar Kayani to Geo TV has upheld his [PM's] stance that he [the PM] was not informed about the Kargil operation.'*

The critics and analysts had taken Nawaz Sharif's version as misleading, too. Gen J G Kiani had not told either Geo TV or the *Dawn* that 'Nawaz Sharif was not informed.' Gen JG Kiani had categorically stated that:

*'Nawaz Sharif was informed later and that too not in a comprehensive manner as has been the practice in army.'*

At the same time, Gen J G Kiani had added that *'Nawaz Sharif approved the already on-going operation provided it would be successful.'*

Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) of Indian Intelligence had noted in their files, as detailed in [OutlookIndia.com](http://OutlookIndia.com), that in the last week of May 1999, Gen Musharraf had been to Beijing on an official tour. He was in daily telephonic contact with Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, the then CGS, in Rawalpindi from his hotel room in Beijing. All those conversations were intercepted by the RAW. The government of Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, later decided to release the transcripts of two tapes to the media. He did it for three reasons:

- Firstly, the tapes showed that it was the Pakistan Army which had occupied the Kargil heights violating the Line of Control (LoC) and not the Kashmiri Freedom Fighters (*Mujahideen*) as had been claimed by Gen Musharraf every now & then.
- Secondly, it was the Pakistan Army which had shot down an Indian Air Force plane and asked the Hizbul Mujahideen to claim the responsibility for it so that the media people go calm.

- Thirdly, the tapes showed that Gen Musharraf had launched his operation without the knowledge of Nawaz Sharif, many of his Corps Commanders, the ISI, the Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy and his Foreign Office.

Gen Musharraf got nervous after the Indian Air Force went into action and there were reports of the Indian naval ships moving from the East to the West coast. Worried over the possibility of the conflict spreading outside Kashmir, Gen Musharraf authorised Lt Gen Aziz from Beijing to brief others about the operation at an inter-ministerial meeting chaired by PM Nawaz Sharif on 29<sup>th</sup> May 1999. At this meeting, as reported by Gen Aziz to Gen Musharraf, there were objections to Gen Musharraf's keeping others in the dark.

According to the account of the meeting as given by Gen Aziz to Gen Musharraf in Beijing over telephone, Nawaz Sharif had defended Gen Musharraf's plans of not informing others as due to demands of operational secrecy. Nawaz Sharif claimed that he himself and other Corps Commanders were informed only a week earlier. He made it appear that Gen Musharraf's action was understandable though the facts were otherwise; but when the Indian Army hit back and the IAF went into action, he lost his nerve and informed firstly Nawaz Sharif and then other senior officers and the Foreign Office.

In reality, instead of rebuking Gen Musharraf for launching the operation without his clearance and asking him to stop it, Nawaz Sharif went along with it hoping that the operation would succeed. When it did not, he flew to the US and sought the US assistance in bringing the fighting to a halt.

It becomes clear that neither Gen Musharraf nor Nawaz Sharif nor Gen J G Kiani was telling the whole truth. Each was telling only a part of the truth which, they thought, would serve their purpose.

There were no two opinions that the PM Nawaz Sharif was not shrewd enough to understand the intrigues of power corridors. He was not skilful enough to choose Gen Musharraf as the Army Chief by ignoring his senior Gen Ali Kuli Khan. The subsequent events had made it clear that he had taken this decision simply on hear-say of his famous five kitchen cabinet members and not by going through the official records available in GHQ.

Secondly, the PM should have understood Gen Musharraf's behaviour from a test assignment that how jubilant he was when once Nawaz Sharif had asked the army to take over WAPDA, a purely civilian function, to improve the organizational working of a corruption ridden department.

A little detail of that test case of running WAPDA to end corruption and to improve its efficiency: after taking over, Gen Musharraf had immediately issued orders that the Army would not only be responsible for the day-to-day running of WAPDA, but would also conduct all future negotiations with the independent power producers, thereby denying any role of the political leadership and civilian bureaucrats in that regard. All postings, transfers & tariff adjustments were shifted towards military officers.

PM Nawaz Sharif was shocked to know all the details but the bird was out of his hands then. Gen Musharraf's writ prevailed. PM Nawaz Sharif had got a first hand knowledge about his Army Chief's way of handling the state affairs.

**On 14<sup>th</sup> June 1999**, B Raman, an expert media analyst, was asked by Jaswant Singh, the then Indian Foreign Minister, some crucial explanations on the Kargil issue. B Raman then tried to reply the queries in an article titled '**Pak Army Chief Caught Yapping**'. When asked that how the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif got aware of the Pakistan Army's proxy invasion plans.

*"He said I (Nawaz Sharif) came to know seven days back (prior to Corp Commander's meeting of 29<sup>th</sup> May 1999), when Corps Commanders were told. The entire reason for the success of this operation was this total secrecy. Our experience was that our earlier efforts failed because of lack of secrecy. So, the top priority is to accord*

*confidentiality, to ensure success. We should respect this; the advantage we have from this would give us a handle."*

Two interpretations were floated in that regard: Firstly that Gen Musharraf had secretly planned the operation, then started the execution of this operation and informed Nawaz Sharif thereafter. The second interpretation was that in a high profile meeting convened by PM Nawaz Sharif, the Foreign Office representative had expressed their unhappiness over the Army for not keeping them in picture since they had to handle the diplomatic fall out.

The conclusion reached by Jaswant Singh was that:

*'Mr Sharif tried to soothe their ruffled feathers by claiming that he himself was informed only seven days earlier in the interest of operational secrecy. This does not necessarily mean that Mr Sharif was not in the picture from the beginning; especially when the DG ISI was his own chick.'*

Gen Musharraf, in his book **'In the Line of Fire (2006)'** had rejected Nawaz Sharif's claim of keeping him in dark on the Kargil issue. The book contains pictorial evidence of Nawaz Sharif's visit to Camp Kel in the south of Kargil where he was briefed by the army high command on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1999. (The Indian Premier Vajpayee had visited Pakistan on 19<sup>th</sup> February 1999 when the Lahore declaration was signed)

Nawaz Sharif, in his book **'Ghaddar Kaun (2007)'**, had given his version saying that:

*'The audio tapes of Gen Musharraf's 26-29<sup>th</sup> May 1999's telephonic talks with Gen Aziz Khan are with him to prove that Gen Musharraf wanted to keep me [Nawaz Sharif] in the dark about the Kargil operation whatsoever.'*

The matter does not end here. Leaving aside the question of whether PM Nawaz Sharif was told about the operation or not, the real issue surfaces that why or how the operation failed. The PM was told earlier or later matters less, but once operation starts the onus of failure comes on the shoulders of the Army Chief who had thought it, planned it, worked it out and launched. It was a total failure on the part of Army Chief and his close associates.

Nawaz Sharif could only be blamed if the operation was going successful and was interfered by political bosses in between or so. Gen Musharraf could be tried for the deaths of over 2700 officers and men of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who were eliminated in the ill-conceived and uncalled for war. In two collective wars of 1965 & 1971 Pakistan had not lost so many lives as we lost in that ill planned activism. It was an ill conceived way of 'internationalizing the Kashmir issue'.

Going into details; when India took the Kargil issue seriously and its Air Force started bombing Pak-army bunkers, Gen Musharraf told PM Nawaz Sharif about the operation first time. It was perhaps 26<sup>th</sup> or 29<sup>th</sup> May 1999 perhaps. During those days, the secretly recorded conversation between Gen Musharraf and Lt Gen Aziz, instituted and taped by the Indian Intelligence, while Gen Musharraf was staying in a hotel at Beijing (China), were also got delivered to Nawaz Sharif by the Indian PM Bajpai through an Indian Diplomat at Islamabad.

Gen Musharraf urged Nawaz Sharif repeatedly to visit the Kargil to boost morale of his army because Indian Army was overtaking all the strategic heights there. The General time and again asked the PM to find out solution to avoid a shameful defeat. Till then the Kargil operation was known by only four persons; Gen Musharraf himself, Lt Gen Aziz the CGS, Lt Gen Mahmood the Corp Commander Rawalpindi and Gen Javed Hasan the Div Commander of Northern Area. Even the other Corp Commanders, Air Chief and Naval Chief were ignorant.

Then a series of meetings were held, sometimes in Rawalpindi Corp Commander Office, then at GHQ, once in Corp Commander Office of Lahore and ultimately a meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee was called (on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1999) where it was decided to contact the US President Bill Clinton for ceasefire lest Pakistan loses all of its stakes.

President Clinton showered a heavy bull-shit, then hesitated to help but ultimately summoned the leadership to Washington. Meeting was arranged. Gen Musharraf gave last briefing to Nawaz Sharif at the Airport. During an emergency meeting with the PM, the American President Bill Clinton rang up Indian PM Bajpai and asked him to stop bombing Kargil; a ceasefire held next day.

Some people believed that Gen Musharraf and his four Generals had decided to oust Nawaz Sharif the same day because they were not able to face their humiliations rising from their own guilt. More so they were expecting an enquiry anytime into the whole Kargil affair.

In fact Nawaz Sharif should have announced so, irrespective of the fact that eleven years earlier a similar enquiry into Ojhri Episode of 10<sup>th</sup> April 1988 had brought an end of the rule for the then Prime Minister Mr Junejo; but the history should have been kept straight.

However, there was another school of thought which considered that Gen Musharraf was right. Gen Tariq, during his interview dated 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2001 (ref: ***Gernailon Ki Syasat by Sohail Worroich*** PP 41-42) categorically stated that:

*'Gen Musharraf stood by the Nawaz Sharif government through every thick & thin. He had recovered millions of rupees from WAPDA defaulters; searched and investigated hundreds of 'ghost schools'; helped the civil government through critical hours of 'Moharram days' and in many other political issues like censuses and local elections on the instance of political Prime Minister.*

*Kargil Operation was initially Okayed by Nawaz Sharif himself but then he backed out. On some secret talk between the two PMs Bajpaie & Nawaz Sharif, the later started double play and suddenly reached America to sign Washington Declaration to end the war. If temporarily our jawans were loosing war then what, the things were in our command and control.*

*In governments, a Show Cause Notice is issued to expel a peon but Gen Musharraf was his Army Chief. The PM should have wait for his come back from Colombo. Gen Musharraf could have taken over earlier if he wanted so. Nawaz Sharif was wrong.'*

**Ayaz Amir**, at present an MNA from Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) but a veteran writer had pointed out that:

*'The real question about Kargil is not whether Sharif knew or not. It is something else. What accounts for the army's institutional capacity to dream up ventures lacking any geo-strategic or political context? Kargil was a misadventure. Sharif was supposed to have a limited attention span. Kargil throws up an intriguing question. Whose intellect span was more limited, Sharif's or that of the army command?'*

Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, who had availed retirement after he was superseded in October 1998 by Gen Musharraf as Army Chief, had analyzed that:

*'Kargil was flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution. The Kargil incursion was a far bigger tragedy for Pakistan than the civil wars which led to the creation of Bangladesh and damaged the country's Kashmir cause, contrary to Gen Musharraf's often repeated claims. The Kargil episode was an unprofessional decision by someone who had served in the Pakistan Army for 40 years.*

*As the architect of Kargil, Gen Musharraf must answer critical questions as to whose brainchild it was and what exactly the broad strategic aim behind the operation was. Let the government appoint a Kargil Commission as had been done in India to hold a thorough investigation and let the nation know the truth about Kargil.'*

In fact, the Indian government had appointed a four-member committee to determine what caused the debacle from their point of view, especially the failure of the Indian intelligence to get wind of Pakistani plans to move into the Kargil heights. Establishing the truth on the Indian side was easy, because there was only one party that was in overall command and



that was the elected civilian government; the military merely carried out the orders what they were asked to do.

The experts opined that to know what actually happened and who committed the blunder in that operation, firstly Nawaz Sharif during his tenure, then Gen Musharraf after October 1999 should have constituted an inquiry commission comprising certain retired officers like Gen Aslam Beg or Gen Shamim Alam including Gen Bukhari (FF), Gen Anwar (AK) and Gen Usmani (FF) [*all officers knowing about that area through their past postings*] so the nation could know the true facts and actual plans, strategy and capability of Pakistan Army.

The historians still feel astray that before Kargil war, Nawaz Shareef was very strong in Pakistan; he sacked President Farooq Leghari, Chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah and even Chief of army staff Jehangir Karamat without anyone daring to challenge him. He was the only prime minister ever in Pakistan that had held over two-third majority in Pakistan parliament and was thinking to become *ameer-ul-momeneen* with absolute power [before Nawaz, it was Z A Bhutto but had simple majority only]. He had full cooperation of Pakistan army with his own chosen Army Chief Pervez Musharraf, his hand picked DG ISI Gen Ziauddin and absolute control over Punjab but why he failed to know about Kargil & Gen Musharraf's person.