

## Scenario 117

### **THE GREAT US RETREAT:**

One could recall those summer days of 2005-06, when some reprobate groups, bearing the flag of Balochistan Liberation Army [BLA] and purporting their origin from Bugti tribe started scaring the Chinese engineers working in Baloch areas and taking them away for ransom.

Once those rebellious criminals had scuttled the Chinese President Hu Jintao's planned visit to Gwadar; just few months after the formal launch of the port city. Gwadar was the height of Sino - Pakistani strategic cooperation then - aiming to make it modern port city; supposed to link Central Asia, western China, and Pakistan with markets in Middle East and Africa.

The American media, however, had accused Pakistan of building a naval base in the guise of a commercial seaport directly overlooking international oil shipping lanes. ***Had it true, the US should have been happy if Pakistan was their strategic partner in South Asia.***

The Indians and some other regional actors were also not comfortable with the Gwadar project because they could feel it as commercial competition or possibly taking big chunk of Gulf trade by Pakistan and China. The Baloch dissidents were being used by many regional and international supporters who never wanted Pakistan moving firmly and strongly to develop the Baloch areas. No doubt, some short sighted Baloch leaders were also helping the rebels to create hindrances in the Pak-China joint projects because their own tribal '**sardari**' was at stake through numerous angles.

### **WHY PAKISTAN TURNED EYES:**

Sardar Akbar Bugti died **on 26<sup>th</sup> August 2006**; some said that the security forces had launched an operation whereas there are reports to suggest that the mud-cave had come down due to blast triggered from inside. The fair investigation report has not been made open yet despite lapse of nearly a decade. US intelligence and their Indian advisors could not cultivate an immediate replacement for Mr Bugti - so they launched an alternate plan.

The US & Indian alliance chose another battlefield and started supporting Abdullah Mehsud, a Pakistani Taliban fighter held for five years in Guantanamo Bay, and then handed over back to the Afghan government, to whom the first '*test assignment*' was allocated to kidnap Chinese engineers working in Balochistan. Mehsud performed that job vigilantly and kidnapped two Chinese engineers; one of whom was eventually killed during a rescue operation launched by the Pakistani security forces.

Abdullah Mehsud had done his leadership well with the help of TTP's that faction which remained associated with Al Qaeda on one side while taking dictations from the Afghan Taliban leadership, too. In early 2007, Abdullah was eliminated in an operation while secretly returning from Afghanistan after meeting his handlers there. A chapter soon closed and the TTP's command was transferred to Baitullah Mehsud.

Referring to Ahmed Quraishi's essay on media dated 19<sup>th</sup> November 2007:

*'This is where Pakistani political and military officials finally started smelling a rat. All of this was an indication of a bigger problem. There were growing indications that, ever since Islamabad joined Washington's regional plans, Pakistan was gradually turning into a **'besieged-nation'**, heavily targeted by the American media while being subjected to strategic sabotage and espionage from Afghanistan.'*

From Pakistan side; that was the beginning of 'ending strategic partnership with the US' in fact – and, near many analysts the start of '**Retreat of US**' from the whole region, too. Afghanistan, under America's watch, had turned into a vast staging ground for sophisticated psychological and military operations to destabilize neighbouring Pakistan. During the years 2005-07, the heat against Pakistan and its military had started emanating; concentrating on Pakistan's western regions in an un-ending demand of '**do more**':

Historians may write it other way but the fact remained that Sardar Bugti's death brought an immense blow to the BLA but the shadowy group's backing states didn't repent. His grandson, Brahmudagh Bugti, was welcome to enjoy a safe shelter in the Afghan capital Kabul, from where he continued to guide his dissident men allegedly on the plans and dictations of RAW through Afghan Intelligence.

Saboteurs trained by the RAW in Afghanistan were inserted into Pakistan to aggravate extremist passions here; sometimes using the name of BLA and sometimes the religious seminaries against Shiite community. Chinese engineers and workers continued to be targeted by individuals pretending to be Islamists or nationalists and whatever the name suited to them. ***Some of them were using encrypted communication equipment far superior to what the Pakistani military owned then.***

Another phase was also seen those days when the most modern arsenal, communication equipment and bags of dollars were fed into the religious movements and al Qaeda remnants in all the B areas of Balochistan. Exploiting the situation, some members of Pakistani media started promoting the disinformation campaign that the Pak-Army was killing its own people.

The rest of the unsuspecting media quickly picked up that message. Some failed joint Pak-US operations against Al Qaeda were given more importance and coverage whereas civilian deaths caused by US drone attacks were also pasted on the foreheads of Pak-Army during that media campaign – the general populace of course demonstrated their panic.

The western block of US + NATO, the UK was also a part of that, found it as the perfect timing to launch a book ***Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy***, a book authored by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, a correspondent for '*Jane's Defence Weekly*', a private intelligence service – some say it a subsidiary of MI-6. The said book was launched in Pakistan in early 2007 which had portrayed the Pakistani military as an institution that was doing more business and less defence job. [*The US, NATO & India should have been delighted over Pak-Army's that sort of engagement – far away from their military professionalism*]

Citing the same article of *Ahmed Quraishi* referred above; the ***insiders believed that the said book was sponsored jointly by Indian & American security establishments.*** Originally from 1988 to 2001, Dr Siddiqa worked in the Military Accounts department and then received a year long fellowship in the United States. Allegedly, the final manuscript of her book was vetted at a publishing office NOT in UK or Pakistan. Some of the juicy details of this campaign included:

*"The American media persistently insisted on handing over Dr A Q Khan to the US to fetch a final conviction against the Pakistani military. Benazir Bhutto demanded after returning to Pakistan in 2007 that the ISI be restructured. Bhutto's opponents compared her attitude with that of July 1999 when an unsigned full page advertisement*

*had appeared in major American newspapers with the headline: **A Modern Rogue Army - with its Finger on the Nuclear Button.***"

Strangely, just a few days before Benazir Bhutto's statement about restructuring the ISI, an American magazine '**The Weekly Standard**' published an interview saying:

*"A large number of ISI agents who are responsible for helping the Taliban and al Qaeda should be thrown in jail or killed. What I think we should do in Pakistan is a parallel version of what Iran has run against us in Iraq: giving money [and] empowering actors." ( Steve Schippert, Weekly Standard, Nov 2007)*

Newsweek came up with an entire cover story with a single storyline: '**Pakistan is a more dangerous place than Iraq**'. Senior American politicians, Republican and Democrat, had argued that 'Pakistan is more dangerous than Iran and merits similar treatment'.

**On 20<sup>th</sup> October 2007**, Senator Joe Biden told ABC News that:

*"We should be in there. We should be supplying tens of millions of dollars to build new schools to compete with the madrassas. We should be in there building democratic institutions. We should be in there, and get the rest of the world in there, giving some structure to the emergence of, hopefully, the re-emergence of a democratic process."*

Two years later, **in September 2009**, the US tried to implement that planning through **Kerry Lugar Bill** but it was tied with so humiliating terms & conditions that Pakistan Army had to refuse it.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), during the same days, recommended gradual sanctions on Pakistan similar to those imposed on Iran including seizing Pakistani military assets abroad. It was all regarding Pakistan's nuclear assets and to '**secure**' them depicting Pakistan as a nation incapable of protecting its nuclear installations. Astonishing explanation it was that a nation [Pakistan] knows how to make a nuclear weapon but does not know where to keep it safe and how to protect it.

**On 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2007**, Jane Harman from the US House Intelligence panel gave statement that:

*"I think the U.S. would be wise – and I trust we are doing this – to have contingency plans [to seize Pakistan's nuclear assets], especially because should Gen Musharraf fall, there are nuclear weapons there."*

The whole above scenario was developed about the possibility of Pakistan breaking up and the possibility of new states of '**Balochistan**' & '**Pashtunistan**' being carved out of it. [*Details are available in **Scenario 111 of 'Judges & Generals in Pakistan Vol-V***] Interestingly, it had taken start from Swat where the *Maulana Sufi* was instructed to take down the Pakistani flag from the top of state buildings and replacing them with his own party flag at an appropriate time; but the Pak-Army handled the situation quite in time. For full details about Swat Operation, book '**Judges & Generals in Pakistan Vol-II**'; Scenario 55 Pages 694-710 is referred.

Then the whole American media was deployed to float theories about how Gen Musharraf might "**disappear**" or be "**removed**" from the scene; it was an attempt to prepare the public opinion for his possible assassination. Already the Pakistanis were made to believe that Benazir Bhutto had the US backing as the next leader of the country.

Americans knew it well that such signals from them and their actions were enough to invite potential assassins to target Benazir Bhutto. Now it is a historical fact that Benazir was ultimately killed in the same way as planned. A dress rehearsal of this scenario had already taken place on **18<sup>th</sup> October 2007** in Karachi and the UN Security Council had to ask the western forces to 'assist' the investigations into the assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto.

Why the Americans were very serious this time about Pakistan; simply because they had been kicked out of Uzbekistan a year earlier, where they were maintaining bases. They were in trouble in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran continued to be a mess for them and Russia and China were much above the US economy. Pakistan must be 'secured' at all costs; it was the apparent US motto then.

This is why the US ambassador in Islamabad Anne Patterson had added one more address to her other most frequently visited address in Karachi, Bilawal House. Bryan Hunt, the US Consul General in Lahore had started wearing the national Pakistani dress, the long shirt and baggy trousers, and was moving around issuing tough warnings to Islamabad to end emergency rule, to resign as army chief and give Benazir Bhutto access to power.

What were the options open for Pakistan then.

To begin with, Islamabad simply ignored John Negroponte, the no: 2 man in the US State Department, who had come to Pakistan those days "to deliver a tough message" to Gen Musharraf, who flatly told him *'he won't end emergency rule until all objectives are achieved.'*

Might not be true but Gen Musharraf's objectives included mainly the cleaning up northern and western Pak - Afghan borders. Gen Musharraf had also told Washington publicly that **"Pakistan is more important than democracy or the constitution"**, a bold position he had taken then.

Pakistani officials had already enraged till then that how Afghanistan had turned into a staging ground for sabotage in Pakistan. Islamabad did not want to see Washington acting as a bully any more either; so cutting off oil supplies to US military in Afghanistan and denying the United States use of Pakistani soil and air space were under serious consideration.

In the developed scenario of ending 2007, Pakistan needed reviewing its role in the war on terror [WOT]. Islamabad needed to fight terrorists on its border with Afghanistan but different methods were to be applied for domestic extremists. That was ***the moment when Islamabad started parting ways with Washington.***

The Americans were telling the world media that they had paid Pakistan \$10.65 billion over the past five years but it did not mean that they had got right to decide Pakistan's destiny. What they didn't tell the world was how Pakistan's help secured for them their biggest footprint ever in energy - rich Central Asia.

### **EPIC CENTRE OF TERRORISM 2012-13:**

**Five Years Later:** Originally; Pakistan's political elite never concentrated on the real threat from terrorist activities within the country nor they ever paid attention to the fatal events occurred on its Pak-Afghan border areas. The Pakistan Peoples Party [PPP], though in saddles since early 2008 could not exhibit its acumen of understanding the real problem not its political opposition PML[N] ever apprised them of the threats.

Of and on army operations to fight against terrorism and extremism were launched since about five years, but neither the political leadership nor the Pak-Army had truly formulated a comprehensive policy and action plan to combat militancy.

The PPP government essentially relied on the army leadership to invent and execute policy and the Pak-Army did not want to drag itself in civil natured activity. In this vacuum, many political leaders, especially from the religious parties, including Imran Khan, had come out with their policy prescriptions based on ***the idea that militancy would vanish if the US forces roll back from the Afghan soils.***

It was true that the foreign occupation of Afghanistan had given rise to strong nationalist impulse that nurtured militancy in Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA], but there were other factors too. Overlooking other main reasons that had pushed Pakistan into the '***epi-centre of terrorism***' could be taken as short sightedness of both civil and army leaderships.

Once an attempt by the Khyber PK government was made to devise a strategy to combat militancy, albeit delayed; it was an admirable initiative but the federal government of PM Gilani did not stand by it by heart. Result was that tens of tribal *jirga* leaders of FATA areas who were sympathetic to Pakistan were either bombarded or assassinated. Blemished and inconsistent external and internal policies pursued over decades had brought Pakistan at the verge of 'failed state'.

The maximum threats came from the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan [TTP] and *jihadi* elements but the sectarian and ethnic militants also posed a serious menace. Although the army's selective operations in FATA brought about limited success, the TTP remained a compelling hazard. Attacks were launched at major military installations, intelligence bases and places of worship where different radical groups acted independently or in union with other groups. Poor governance, weak state structures and flawed national policies facilitated the rising power and influence of these groups.

The writ of the state was not seen anywhere and the leaderships, both political and military, went bewildered and puzzled. Illiteracy, unemployment, the elitist character of our society, endless lust for dollars and persistent corruption also contributed to extremism. There was no strategy seen with the government to neutralise the sectarian and radical organisations; they continued to advocate violence and mobilize bloodshed.

Till 2008, the people had started raising voices that nine years military rule had contributed towards militancy. When the PPP government took over, they thought that it would herald well for combating terrorism but it did not prove its ability nor had the acumen. Referring to '***The Express Tribune***' dated **31<sup>st</sup> May, 2012**:

*'.....but the verdict of the people against military rule and their rejection of religious parties were regrettably not channelled usefully against extremist forces. To clean the swamp of militants required economic development and political integration of FATA into the mainstream, along with a host of other measures.*

*Terrorism could be beaten when political elite mobilise themselves to isolate and defeat its perpetrators, but by remaining a silent majority they allowed a free hand to militants. The TTP and other militant groups have become media savvy and are putting across their narrative effectively.'*

The Interior Ministry of the PPP government totally failed in its objectives; no militant organisation was banned; no watch on their activities was laid; no intelligence was attempted to get to the roots of such groups; their motivation level could not be ascertained; no source of their funding was identified and their patrons could not be located.

The Interior Ministry remained busy in delivering speeches against their opponents and kept on transporting the looted money bags to Dubai and London. Issuing of Blue Passports to the sons, daughters and parents of their beloved ones, and stamping gratis visas for the CIA agents and XE employees remained the priority jobs for whole hierarchy of the ministry.

The TTP, on the other hand, kept on paying its cadres from earnings acquired from criminal activity, drug trade, charities and collecting extortion money called '*bhattas*'. Their financial inflows had to be squeezed; had to coin special laws try-able in summary courts with specially enhanced powers for the judges.

There was a large internal displacement of people during military operations, nearly 300,000 in South Waziristan alone. No suitable rehabilitation plan was available with federal or provincial government except photo sessions of the local political figures. They were in turn exploited by the militants. With 70-80% of the population unemployed, a female literacy rate of 3-5%, and a large number of people under the age of 30, the government's highest priority in FATA should have been focussed on employment and education coupled with provision of material basic necessities

Militancy and extremism can nowhere be defeated piecemeal; a comprehensive policy and a serious action plan was needed – the nation, though having nuclear capabilities within, but was being drifted into a dangerously downward spiral by the militants – sometimes seemingly connived with the ruling PPP stalwarts in Karachi and PML[N] elite in Punjab.

### **PAK-ARMY'S NEW DOCTRINE:**

During ending weeks of 2012, a new chapter was added to the Pakistan's Army Doctrine that also included threats posed by sub-conventional warfare. It was a conspicuous and visible paradigm shift in its decades-old policy; Pak-Army first time openly described home - grown militancy as the "biggest threat" to national security. Even the outsiders had noted that:

*"Pakistan's armed forces were trained for conventional warfare but the current security situation necessitated the change. Forces fighting on the front-line in the tribal regions were put to immediate and vigorous training as per requirements of sub-conventional warfare".*

The foreign media, with distinguished presence in Pakistan like BBC, CNN, Herald Tribune and allied foreign inspired press like the Daily Times and Dawn celebrated that **New Military Doctrine in Green book 2102**. The news & reports openly indicated that the Pakistan Army had felt the "internal threat" as a bigger challenge than the external one. The ISPR and the media, however, moved their steps very cautiously due to its sensitivity.

According to the new Military Doctrine, ongoing activities of Taliban militants in the restive tribal regions and unabated terrorist attacks on government installations in major cities were posing a real threat to Pakistan's security. The said Doctrine dealt with operational preparedness and was to be reviewed on and off. For decades, the army considered India as its No 1 enemy but growing extremism in the country compelled the military authorities to review its strategy keeping in view the both fronts.

A senior military official confirmed to the media that preparation of the new doctrine started a year ago and was then put into full operation. Director General [DG] ISPR Maj Gen Asim Saleem Bajwa told the media that:

'...the development is definitely there. Army prepares for all forms of threats. Sub-conventional threat is a reality and is a part of threat matrix faced by our country. But it doesn't mean that the conventional threat has receded.'

According to the BBC, the new Army Doctrine talked about unidentified militant groups and their role to create unrest in the country. It also mentioned that Pakistani militants had found refuge across the Durand Line in Afghanistan; mostly on reciprocal basis.

The Doctrine also mentioned about the '**foreign proxies**' for creating unrest in some parts of the country; although it did not name any country but obviously the pointing was towards India and Afghanistan with, of course, the US at the back of both. India's proven role in creating disturbances in Balochistan, in the backdrop of deadly separatist insurrection since 2004 could be cited as reference.

Pakistan never pre-empted the US raid in Abbottabad on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2011 alone because of lack of threat perception from western borders [Afghanistan] and Pak-Army's whole attention remained focussed on Eastern Border strategies but, as Lt Gen (rtd) Talat Masood told the BBC:

*"It's a fact that before the new army doctrine, India was Pakistan's No 1 enemy. All military resources were focused on India. For the first time it has been realised that Pakistan faces the real threat from within – a threat which is concentrated in areas along western borders."*

The new strategy also stressed that formulation of the defence policy was not the responsibility of the army alone. Other organs of the states would play their respective roles, too. In an effort to elicit public support against violent extremism, the army made public its new doctrine which was adequately adored, admired and respected.

It was abundantly available on record that throughout his tenure, Gen Kayani, the Army Chief, had been falsely blamed to deflect US pressure for Pakistani action against *jihadi* groups operating from the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. The world media have been forgetting that Pakistan had also been facing similar threats and killing activities from the splinter groups having refuge in Afghan territorial limits. **Pakistan was burning in its own way**; the domestic challenges included acute violence in two of its major cities, Karachi and Peshawar; growing Sunni - Shia conflict; and a chronic electrical power crisis that was more of a threat to stability than terrorism.

Scepticism and disbelief prevailed on both sides; the US & Pakistan. The US had given a practical demonstration to the whole world, by launching a direct attack in Abbotabad; declaring open that it did not believe in Pakistan any more. That event was the parting of ways in fact.

During the same days of 2011, Pakistan was planning to launch offensive cleansing operation in Waziristan as per US-Pak commitments. After the US operation in Abbotabad Pakistan was no more bound to honour its part of 'moral commitment'. Then *Salala* event of 26<sup>th</sup> November 2011, killing 24 Pakistani army-men played a vital role. The US in fact tried to frighten Pakistan through that bombing – but the US move got them into its own neck.

Pakistan not only delayed the Waziristan Operation but also blocked the US and NATO transportation through the Pak-soils. Pakistan had to wait for its operations till the US forces started packing up from the Afghan soils though the NATO routes were opened in mid 2012.

So these were two litmus tests for analysing the value of that pronounced doctrinal change, both of which entailed fundamental departures in well-established security calculations which ultimately ended with the US un-ceremonial departure from Afghan lands.

Due to routine shifting within the army planning portals, Pakistan might have tolerated the Taliban for some years, depending upon the geo-political situations around and especially versus India - out of fears of Indian strategic encirclement. However, when the Taliban's organization splintered into factions, adopted structural changes within themselves, when the Taliban went multidirectional under various leaderships within, when Taliban themselves divided into more than twenty groups, when Taliban's some groups started joining hands with Al Qaeda – the change in Pakistan Army's policy documents was inevitable.

Every state on globe wants to keep its borders silent but keeping its safety first – so was the Pakistan Army's desire. They never felt any possibility of aggression from Afghanistan; neither sponsored by the Afghan government nor from the independent non state actors near Pak-Afghan borders. As the domestic militants, mostly the sectarian promoters, started waging war against the Pakistani state, Pak-Army had to move its horses as per demand of the situation.

Pakistan wanted to help the US to become involved in reconciliation process between the Taliban and the Kabul government, including releasing a number of jailed Taliban leaders as a goodwill gesture, as well as offering other diplomatic services to bring diversified chiefs of various tribal leaders on negotiation table; one US Commander [Gen Mc Chrystal in early 2009] did not consider it worth. Mc Chrystal tried its best for about a year to ride on solo flights but the Taliban continued to dither about on one pretext or the other.

After eight months the next US commander Gen Paetrus especially requested the Pakistan Army again to go with the earlier offer. The core item on the agenda remained that '**Afghanistan has to bear his burden at his own**'.

A Reuters report correctly conveyed the message to the US, reflecting the Pakistan military's resolve, saying: '**..... we just want them to be masters of themselves so we concentrate on our own problems**'. The outcome brought significant implications not only for Pakistan itself but the larger region as well.

The more talked about apprehension; whether the doctrinal revisions would bring about a more relaxed nuclear posture towards India. Pakistan might have rapidly expanded its nuclear stockpile [*it is Pakistan's prerogative being a free and independent nation*], especially in tactical nuclear weapons. Many were worried that South Asia was on the verge of a destabilizing nuclear arms competition – but Pakistan's stance was clear and logical.

Gen Kayani justified the need for battlefield nuclear options by pointing to the threat posed by the Indian army's Cold Strategic Doctrine which had miss-interpreted and thus unnecessarily out-blown the threat of Pakistan's nuclear development and demanded sanctions on it in order to deter Pakistan's alleged adventurism.

The polarised world kept on crying but there were no signs that Pakistan's military establishment was reversing its objectives, though PPP leadership, on the instigation of their US counterparts, sometimes asked tougher questions about the direction of the nuclear program. After Gen Kayani's scheduled retirement during ending 2013, the resolve has gone more strong with the new PML[N] government in saddles along with the new army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif.

### **NEW DOCTRINE vs EASTERN BORDERS:**

**On 30<sup>th</sup> December 2012**, COAS Gen Kayani used a term '**amorphous enemy**' in his speech at the 98th Midshipmen Commissioning term and 7th SSC Officer's class in Karachi. In a significant revision to the Green book, Gen Kayani had enshrined another dimension in the



threat matrix and declared the '**internal threat**' as the biggest threat to the security of the country. The ISPR had told the media then that:

*'Though the army's new doctrine of focusing on Strategic as well on sub-conventional warfare was put into practice in May 2012. It has already created waves with its reporting in the international media. A professional army like of the Pakistan Army has to review its doctrine with adding of new subjects / matters, as in the present case.'*

**Till January 2013;** the new doctrine was just out; the general populace in Pakistan was worried if the Pakistan Army was moving away from the threat on the Eastern border. The fact remained that the *Pak-Army had the same old policy with a few additional chapters added.* Gen Kayani and his commanders started focussing on the internal threat then, though the army should have planned that strategy a decade ago. An Anti-Terror Division could have been created in the post Nine Eleven era.

The Green book, which the Pak-Army announced as new blue print then discussed, published and circulated amongst their decision making officers and staff like each year's routine with special strategic papers written by professional soldiers; given with their possible solutions and suggestions on numerous subjects. 2012-13's Green Book had papers focusing on internal terror threats. The international media made a big deal about this. That year, the Green books were made available to the public think tanks too.

The much-discussed '**strategic depth**' doctrine of the military also remained fully intact - which clarified that *a peaceful, secure and friendly Afghanistan meant that our western borders are safe.* Hence the Pakistani military could fully concentrate on the eastern borders.

The intelligentsia had genuine reservations that why Pak-Army finally talked about this new strategy when the writing had been on the wall since a decade at least. Gen Kayani, had left all of the Pakistan Army's major installations naked and defence-less. Normal contingency plans were definitely in place to safeguard each military installation like **Dargai** SSG Training Centre, GHQ, **Kamra** Air Base, Karachi Naval Base and many others but Pak-Army officers, retired and serving both, raised fingers on the competency of Gen Kayani.

Gen Kayani, as Army Chief, witnessed attack after attack on its vital installations. Gen Kayani could not even defend his own office - GHQ in Rawalpindi. It took a few idiots with Kalashnikovs to keep the sixth largest army's base hostage for more than a day. How could goons attack the Mehran Airbase or Kamra - how could a fly transgress into these key-bases? The Pakistani nation had been so confident in their army - that how could a mosquito cross the boundary walls into such huge installations - what to speak of RAW's paid some '*mir-jafars or mir-sadiqs*' in Pak-Army?

During 2009-10, the Interior Ministry had facilitated more than 6000 US spy-agents, by issuing them Pakistani visas without ISI's clearance, issued from Washington and Dubai Consulates by keeping open their offices on Sundays & Fridays respectively, many of them with address in Pakistan written as **President House Islamabad** - all of them were Black Water & XE's undercover security personnel. Gen Shuja Pasha's team failed to keep their track. In short - Gen Kayani and Gen Pasha both faced colossal failures in their tenures and Pakistan and its army itself suffered a lot then.

Gen Kayani & Gen Pasha's teams, sorry to say, were unable to infiltrate and extinguish the TTP, and they failed to prevent the massive inflow of foreign fighters and spies into Pakistan. Pakistan's western borders remained loose and it has not been able to use the Afghan war to country's advantage. Why did it take so long for the army to recognize existence of foreign agencies in Pakistan?

Pak-Army's retired Generals, the old strategists, maintained that the *'foreign agency infested' Wakhan Corridor* should have been targeted much earlier when the Pak-Army had noticed the first anti-Pakistan activity there. Gen Kayani should have taken notice of the intentions of the then political leadership who were keen to award an MFN status to India – while they never wanted it in open.

The whole Pakistan was devastated with India & US made arsenal, explosive mines, communication gadgets, bomb making devices and dangerous chemicals – did Gen Kayani or Gen Pasha's teams ever called the record of off - loaded containers at Karachi terminal to compare with the actually left *Chaman* or *Torkham* borders then.

The corruption stories of officers and men deployed by Pakistan Customs Directorates on the entry & exit points were printed in the western and American media – which indicated that Pak-Army had not kept track of those containers and the 'business' flourished day by day involving billions of dollars for American sellers, transporters, security agencies and Pakistan Customs; and it continued for years.

Dr Shoaib Suddle's Inquiry report into **'Lost ISAF Containers'** was never called by Gen Kayani or Gen Pasha's team to know the real background facts. A detailed perspective on ISAF Containers is available in Scenario 94 of **'Judges & Generals in Pakistan Vol-V'**.

No doubt, the Pak-Army remained alert against the threat matrix - mainly composed of external threats, nuclear threats, and conventional warfare - there was no or little attention given to the internal threats, whatsoever. Till ending 2012, Pakistan had gone late and the non-state actors had gone too strong and organized. After the loss of nearly 47,000 Pakistani lives, the Pakistani decision makers felt they were facing a well funded and foreign supported terrorist groups spread all over Pakistan.

By this pace, Pakistan would take one more decade for its army to recognize the extant of cyber terror.

Pak-Army's activity, however, remained confined up to planning and documentation that whole year of 2013 till Gen Raheel Sharif stepped in and an action plan announced. Gen Kayani had chaired the meeting. It was resolved then that:

***".....the threat matrix of conventional and now sub-conventional threat will be addressed simultaneously and no one has forgotten to counter the conventional threat being faced by the country"***

What took so long Gen Kayani to recognize the obvious?

### **CIVIL INTERNAL FACTORS:**

During the same month on the civil side, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf said that Pakistan would have to redefine its military doctrine to comprehensively tackle terrorism – in other words the political elite had also given green signal to the army for shaping the said new doctrine. Some of the public statements at different occasions were:

- *"We need to work on a strategy which can comprehensively tackle terrorism. We have to redesign and redefine our military doctrine to achieve this objective.*
- 
- *The forces of doom and gloom thrive in an environment of chaos, uncertainty and instability. We need to guard against all such forces, which are out to derail the system so assiduously put in place after a protracted struggle.*
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- *Threats to Pakistan's national security stem from mainly non-state actors who are targeting state's symbols and institutions in a bid to impose their agenda. This is an enemy which is nameless and faceless.*
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- *While highlighting the sacrifices of the security forces, law enforcement agencies and citizens in the war against terrorism, we need to redefine the military doctrine.*
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- *Our national security institutions must improve intelligence gathering and establish effective coordination among civil and military institutions to attain optimum results."*

All bull-shit political statements – not a single phrase that the government would change 170 years old legal procedures, standards of evidence and summary courts procedures to dispose off the cases within days not years.

The military's desire to combat terrorism had always been thwarted by weak laws and flawed prosecution process. Belatedly a strong anti-terrorism law was introduced in the National Assembly but could not bring any fruit.

The army was bitter about the Swat experience where it successfully flushed out the terrorists back in 2007-08 - but it had to continue holding Swat without the civilian administration developing the capability to take over. Not a single person, that the military nabbed in the once peaceful valley, had been convicted.

The new chapter in Pakistan Army's Doctrine blamed **foreign proxies** from unnamed countries for creating unrest in some parts of the country. It was obvious that the army was referring to India's role in creating disturbances in Balochistan, which had been plagued by a deadly terrorist activity since 2004 through unidentified militant groups [TTP, BLA]. It also mentioned that Pakistani militants had found refuge across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. The ISPR explained that:

*"Pakistan's armed forces were trained for conventional warfare but the current security situation necessitated the change...Forces fighting on the front-line in the tribal regions are now being trained according to the requirements of sub-conventional warfare."*

But; it only took 10 years to realize this.

The ***Express Tribune dated 29<sup>th</sup> January 2013***, ended an essay with:

*'We wish Gen Kayani a fond farewell. His term of office will be remembered for his failures, not his successes. Perhaps the next general will stop the drones, and create an army which can face future and present threats.'*

***In 2011-13***, Pakistan was preoccupied with rising violence in Karachi and Quetta and then in general elections, the paradigm shift in the US policy on Afghanistan was not taken much note of. The Pak-Army had placed a plan before America, as far as in 2010, to cope with the then prevailing situations within Afghanistan and across the borders. That doctrine was built on three advisory but friendly propositions based on the factual foresight that American troops had to be withdrawn from Afghanistan – sooner or later.

The three step strategy suggested by Pak-Army was firstly – ISI would be ready to put in efforts for reconciliation among Afghan factions – perhaps it might not be possible otherwise; secondly - Jalalabad – Torkham - Karachi route would be made open, being the most viable, for withdrawing American forces; and lastly - India would not be allowed to play any role during implementation of the said plans.

Recalling the little history; in 2009, Gen McChrystal, Commander ISAF and of US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A), had asked the US government for a 'troop surge' which inducted 30,000 - 40,000 additional troops into Afghanistan. In 2010, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 187th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 101st Sustainment Brigade were deployed to Afghanistan. '***the News' dated 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2013*** is referred.

The year of 2010, Gen Petraeus, the new commander ISAF and USFOR-A, instead of considering the Pakistan's offers seriously and preferred to implement his "**Comprehensive Counter - Insurgency (COIN) strategy**". Gen Petraeus' COIN had his own four way solution of the Afghan War based on firstly by securing and serving the population; secondly by understanding local circumstances; thirdly by separating hard core from reconcilable; and lastly by living among the people.

By 2011, for America the cost of war in Afghanistan reached a colossal \$500 billion mark and the US had suffered 1,814 fatalities. By that time, Petraeus' four way strategy of COIN had started falling flat – one by one. America could no longer sustain the war in Afghanistan – neither politically nor financially. Finally, President Obama, in a prime time speech, indicated to follow Pak-Army suggestions by announcing a troop drawdown schedule.

That was the background that **on 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2012**, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to initiate talks with Pakistan's COAS Gen Kayani.

**On 17<sup>th</sup> December 2012**, the Federal Court in New York was officially told by the White House that:

***"In the view of the United States, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is entitled to immunity because it is part of a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act)."***

This was an implicit acceptance of the ISI's indispensability by the US elite in the Afghan endgame. It was a great win for Pak-Army and its ISI.

**On 29<sup>th</sup> December 2012**, Pakistan received \$688 million as Coalition Support Fund (CSF). According to the Ministry of Finance, "*from May 2010 onwards Pakistan had asked for \$2.5 billion under the CSF but only \$1.9 billion have been reimbursed.*"

**On 10<sup>th</sup> February 2013**, two convoys each hauling 25 shipping containers from Afghanistan entered Pakistan at the Chaman and Torkham borders heading back to where they came from. To be certain, those convoys were in fact taking back around 750,000 major military items, mainly communication gadgets and heavy arsenal, valued at about \$40 billion.

It was known to the world media that the British government had acted as the intermediaries in that latest US - Pakistan negotiations and that Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were also involved in talks. Pakistan had once again become the key player in the Afghan endgame. In fact; India's plans of encompassing Pakistan had evaporated till then.

So far as elections 2013 were concerned, the ISPR had rightly clarified that:

*'The Army supports timely elections and the military has no favourites. Whoever wins the elections fair and square and forms a government is acceptable to it. Hence Nawaz Sharif has nothing to fear that powers that be have any desire to block him.'*

In that context, the military leadership considered it an insult to its intelligence to be accused of backing Tahirul Qadri. Totally rejecting the then popular public perception that '**.... non-**

***state political actors looking at the GHQ for support'*** to scuttle the election process in the name of accountability was not only discredited but abandoned as well.

Once it was perceived that the APC called by Maulana Fazlur Rehman had the unspoken backing of the military. Maulana was keen that the civilian leadership should collectively hold talks with the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan [TTP]. Talks were settled to take place with a position of strength rather than weakness. Similarly any agreement was to be strictly within the ambit of the constitution, law and writ of the Pakistan government.

The military was extremely worried about internal instability, terrorism and a weakening economy in Pakistan. The military supported intra-Afghan dialogue with the belief that political process should be in the lead. Within the parameters of its strategic doctrine the military desired a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. It was no longer keen to foist a government of its choice in Kabul. However, it firmly believed that once the US troops left the Afghan soils, Pakistan should not be left in the wrong corner as it was done after the Soviet troops had left Afghanistan in 1980s.